Published on Revers: Is it possible to trust Grok? Let’s explore it using the example of Donbass

Increasingly on X, people are relying on Elon Musk’s “Grok” algorithm for verification of information in posts. However, while to some this may seem a useful tool, what it is doing is reinforcing Western and allied regimes’ positions and whitewashing their crimes.

Grok draws information from dominant narratives—usually established by legacy media with its very long track record of pro-Western lies and war propaganda—to conclude whether information in a particular post is true. When it comes to matters in which the West and Israel (among others) have a vested interest in controlling the narrative, Grok sides with the claims purveyed by legacy media. Instead of providing objective, truthful, answers, it creates a propaganda loop of actual disinformation.

Thus, as was the case some days ago, Grok determined that a post of mine on Ukraine’s use of internationally-banned PFM-1 “Petal” mines against Donbass civilians was “pro-Russian disinformation” and that, “Evidence suggests PFM-1 use in Donetsk (2022) was likely Russian false flag, not Ukraine…”

This is in spite of the fact that I was back in Donetsk in late July 2022 when Ukraine fired rockets containing hundreds of these mines on Donetsk and surrounding areas. On July 30, at 9:23 pm, I wrote on my Telegram channel about a strong explosion I’d just heard in central Donetsk. An hour later, DPR journalist Georgy Medvedev wrote on his channel warning civilians not to go near the mines and not to walk on grass or areas where they could have landed. In fact, for weeks after, I walked constantly looking down at my feet and avoiding anything that was visible pavement, so tiny and difficult to see are the mines.

They are the size of an average lighter, brown or green, and blend in very well wherever they land. Even when I saw a sign warning of a mine, it was difficult to initially see them.