By Freddie Ponton

“It is not satellites in the sky, but pipes on the ocean floor that form the backbone of the world’s economy.”

– Retired US Navy Admiral James Stavridis

21st Century Wire 26 February 2025

Modern criminology invites us to revisit our approach to the Nord Stream sabotage and ultimately forces us to explain the decisions made by the Nord Stream saboteurs and the reasons which led them to target the Nord Stream pipelines in the deeper waters of the Danish and Swedish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea, rather than opting for a mission in the considerably shallower waters of the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), where both Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 could have easily been targeted at once.

This fundamentally raises critical questions regarding the saboteur’s tactical operation, raising the possibility that submarines were involved in the Nord Stream sabotage.

Were the Naval surface activities in the Baltic Sea a mere representation of the covered activities below?

The rationale for the presence of submarines is rooted in their inherent qualities of stealth and discretion – which render them a crucial element in both conventional naval operations and irregular warfare. This distinctive capability enables submarines to influence the trajectory of crisis and military engagements by positioning themselves strategically at critical times and sites to gather intelligence on perceived enemies’ positions or infrastructures, and open valuable options to execute covered operations.

Submarines are among if not the most lethal and effective weapons used by world-leading navies, because of their ability to deliver substantial blows to peer adversaries while seeking to capitalize on their vulnerabilities.  It has become apparent that the Nord Stream pipelines were extremely vulnerable to an attack conducted from the bottom of the Baltic Sea when all eyes were focused on NATO naval surface exercises.

In this article, we will explain how a coordinated NATO submarine covert operation was planned and rehearsed to deliver a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) that the saboteurs would have devised before prosecuting the attack on the Nord Stream pipelines on September 26, 2022 in the Danish and Swedish Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). We will also demonstrate how such an operation fits squarely into NATO’s operational Chain of Command during its BALTOPS 22 naval exercise in the summer of 2022, as well as Northern Coasts 2022 drill which coincided with the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.

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Why Choose the Danish and Swedish EEZ?

The addition of both Sweden and Finland into the NATO means that almost all of the Baltic littoral states are now members of the Alliance, leading many western politicians and geopolitical analysts to to label the Baltic Sea as a “NATO lake.”

“[Sweden and Finland] make NATO much more geographically coherent. The Baltic Sea becomes a NATO lake, which is generally useful, also because of the Arctic’s increased importance,” said Ulrike Franke, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, during the 2023 Alliance summit in Vilnius.

More importantly, there is very little that can happen within this maritime domain without the knowledge of the NATO hierarchy – unless of course, it is NATO itself who is conducting an operation, or exercise.

As we will demonstrate, the maritime borders of NATO member states are of great relevance in investigating any underwater demolition, especially any deliberate act of sabotage which took place in the Danish and Swedish EEZ on September 26, 2022.

It becomes even more relevant still, with the realisation that NATO member Germany cannot pretend to be aloof as to nefarious underwater activities at the blast sites of the Nord Stream sabotage.

Our investigation poses a crucial question that requires a thorough answer to clarify the mystery of the Nord Stream sabotage.

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MAP:  Nord Stream Explosions sites (Source: Sanderson et al, Environmental impact of sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines (2023). DOI: 10.21203/rs.3.rs-2564820/v1)

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Q: Why would the saboteurs choose to blow up the Nord Stream pipelines in Denmark and Sweden’s EEZ instead of opting for the much shallower waters of Germany’s EEZ?

• The attack on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in Denmark’s waters could be seen as an attack on a NATO member, potentially invoking Article 5 of the NATO treaty. In contrast, sabotaging the pipelines in German waters would be easier but could heavily pressure the German government, especially after it sanctioned Nord Stream 2 before Russia’s military action in Ukraine.
• The detonation of NS1 and NS2 in Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zone could have impacted Natura 2000 sites, a network of protected areas covering Europe’s most valuable and threatened species and habitats. The Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NABU) reported the potential endangerment of five protected areas in an attempt to stop the Nord Stream 2 project. The German Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency (BSH) also highlighted that the pipeline crosses a busy traffic separation zone, suggesting that a Mine/Seabed warfare operation in this sensitive area was simply not an option.
• It makes sense for the saboteurs to have chosen the 100-meter-deep Bornholm Deep Basin for its depth, which reduces the chance of witnesses. This location allows for better concealment and manoeuvrability for submarines, with quick access to blast sites and escape routes to Poland and Germany’s Exclusive Economic Zones. Submarine operations in the Baltic Sea are managed and deconflicted by the German Submarine Operations Authority (SubOpAuth), in collaboration with NATO and Baltic states.
• The administrative authority of the German Navy (SubOpAuth) oversees NATO submarine activities in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland. It monitors and coordinates activities in the Danish and Swedish EEZs to prevent interference or collisions and can set exclusion zones in these EEZs if required. Such authority provided control over the underwater operational theatre.

Nord Stream 2 AG Permit

On October 30,  2019, The Danish Energy Agency (DEA) granted a permit to Nord Stream 2 AG for its Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline project and the construction of two parallel natural gas pipelines in the Danish continental shelf area in the Baltic Sea, southeast of Bornholm.

The permit was issued following a series of consultations with the Danish Working Environment Authority, the Danish Directorate of Fisheries, the Danish Defence Command/Navy Command, the Danish Ministry of Defence Estate Agency, the Danish Geodata Agency, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, the Agency for Culture and Palaces and the Danish Maritime Authority and likely others…

DOCUMENT: The Danish Energy Agency  Permit allowing Nord Stream 2 AG to lay the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline in Danish EEZ. Click here to read.

In the Permit, we find a section titled 1.2. Conditions and the Article 28 which reads as follows:

“28. Nord Stream 2 AG shall submit the data acquired during the construction and operational phase in the military practice areas to the [Danish] Naval Command. Data from the NATO submarine exercise areas may not be published or shared with third parties without the permission of the [Danish] Naval Command.”

Article 28 of this permit allows us to establish without making any assumptions, that the Danish EEZ  waters in which NS2 pipelines were sabotaged, are “NATO Submarine exercise areas.”

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Danish Energy Agency (DEA) Permit for Nordstrean 2 AG – Section 1.2. Conditions and Article 28 (Source: Danish Energy Agency)

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In the “Military Practice Areas” section of the permit (page 40), the Permit indicates, in a consultation response from the Federal Office for Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Services of the German Armed Forces” (BAIUDBw), carried out on behalf of NATO,  that “the German Navy administers nine contiguous NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm, which are situated in the Danish, Swedish and Polish exclusive economic zones.”

Furthermore, the permit indicates that the Nord Stream “Route variant NSP2 / NSP2 V2 passes through three submarine areas, whilst NSP2 / NSP2 V1 only passes through two submarine areas in the western peripheral part of [the submarine] areas. The two route variants’ impact on the so-called “safe-bottoming areas,” were deemed by BAIUDBw inconsequential in nature”.

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DEA Permit for Nordstrean AG – Page 40 (Source: Danish Energy Agency)

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The permit describes the consultation response in which the BAIUDBw stated:

“If the Danish authorities require Nord Stream 2 AG to publish the results of monitoring programmes concerning the environmental conditions during the construction and operating phase within NATO’s submarine exercise areas, the results must not be published for security reasons in relation to NATO partners and friendly nations, unless mutual agreement can be reached with the German Navy concerning the content of the material that is to be published. It shall be ensured that security-relevant and sensitive military data concerning NATO and friendly nations shall not be published.”

BAIUDBw consultation response to the Danish Energy Agency was presented to the Danish Maritime Command which stated that they supported Germany’s demand and that data from the NATO submarine exercise areas was never to be published without the express consent of the German military. The Danish Naval Command proposed that data for approval concerning the NATO Submarine practice areas in the Danish EEZ would be disseminated to the German military via the Danish Naval Command before publication.

According to the Maritime Spatial Planning in the German Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ):

“The military training areas secured in the spatial plan as reservation areas for defence also include cross-border training areas under NATO administration such as the Bravo[s] submarine search areas in the Baltic Sea. They are located proportionately in the German EEZ and in the Swedish and Danish planning areas. Even though Denmark and Sweden have not defined any spatial designations for defence, the plan is drawn up in consultation with the ministries responsible for defence in order to take into consideration national and alliance defence concerns. As a result, no designations incompatible with the concerns of defence are made”.

In the areas shown in Figure 19 in the annexe document Appendix to the German Spatial Planning Ordinance for the Baltic Sea, we can identify distinct areas which are designated as reservations for defence according to their military purposes including the following submarine diving areas.

• Trolle submarine exercise area
• Walkyria submarine exercise area
• NATO submarine exercise areas (Bravo 2, Bravo 3, Bravo 4)

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Figure 19: Designations for national and alliance defence in the Baltic Sea U-Boottauchgebiete = Submarine diving area (Source: BSH)

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According to BAIUDBw, NATO submarine diving areas east of Bornholm are actually part of an integrated system of nine NATO submarine diving areas (NSDA). NATO has transferred the responsibility for these areas and their administration to the German Navy. As we have mentioned above, parts of these NSDA are located in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZ and are used by both NATO members and friendly nations. Six of these NATO submarine diving areas are located entirely or partially within the Polish EEZ. Two of these NATO submarine diving areas are described as “Safe Bottoming Areas”, where emergency measures (e.g.diving and grounding of submarines) can be practised. In these areas, the seabed has been cleared of any ammunition or boulders in particular to ensure maximum safety, making these diving areas the perfect launch pad for conducting a covert seabed irregular warfare operation.  (Source: BTS P14).

We note that Poland EEZ borders both Sweden and Danish EEZ, which makes the Military Port Command of Świnoujście (Kołobrzeg), home to the 8th Coastal Defence Flotilla of the Polish Navy, a very strategic location, especially when taking into consideration the fact this military port is the very harbour the Andromeda Yacht and its alleged Ukrainian crew used in September 2022.

Nevertheless, as stated by German Rear Admiral Christian Bock, Commander of the German Operational Flotilla 1 in 2020:

“The German Navy is not only the largest alliance [NATO] navy with access to the Baltic Sea, but above all has detailed knowledge and a lot of experience with the navigationally and tactically demanding operational area above and below water. Diving for long periods of time undetected in the shallow, narrow and busy waters of the Baltic Sea requires very well-trained and experienced crews.Germany is the only Baltic Sea member of the alliance that can use its submarines submerged throughout the Baltic Sea“

It only stands to reason that based on this information and data, a thorough investigation into the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines will require a closer examination of NATO submarine’s activities during these key timeframes – including all of their movements, activities and drills they may have participated in, especially those which occurred before and during the period of BALTOPS 22 and Northern Coasts 22 exercises leading up to the destruction of Nord Stream 1 and 2.

Submarine Operation Authority (SubOpAuth)

SubOpAuth stands for Submarine Operations Authority and can be described as a de-confliction agency for underwater operational movement. The Commander of the SubOpAuth Task Force (CTF 355) may have had Command and Control (C2) over submarine operations carried out in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 22; However, our research indicates that in the context of a NATO-led operation, Germany’s SubOpAuth Commander (CTF355), might have acted as subordinate to the Commander Submarine NATO (COMSUBNATO), based in Northwood UK, at NATO Allied Maritime Command Headquarters, MARCOM.

The ESPOO  summary responses report appendix 3 seems to indicate that the German Submarine Operations Authority was located during the period leading to the Nord Stream explosions, at the German Navy Headquarters, DO EXAS, Glucksburg in Germany.

In his February 2023 report, American journalist Seymour Hersh claimed that US Navy divers participated in the Nord Stream sabotage and planted explosives at various locations, known today as ‘Nord Stream blast sites’, during the US-led NATO Maritime Exercise BALTOPS 22.

Although the information we have described above provided some solid background upon which our investigation could rest, we would still need confirmation that NATO Submarine operations were conducted under the leadership of a German submarine Authority during BALTOPS 22, a US Sixth Fleet-led Large Scale Exercise (LSE) conducted under the leadership of USN Vice Admiral Gene Black, Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (COMSTRIKFORNATO), on behalf of General Tod D. Wolters, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). We note that General Wolters was replaced by General Christopher G. Cavoli on July 4, 2022, who also assumed duties as Commander of U.S. European Command, making him the SACEUR and the Commander USEUCOM  at the time of the Nord Stream explosions.

Confirming a German SubOpAuth was active during BALTOPS 2022 is not a straightforward task, as NATO and the German Bundeswehr are not known for their transparency when it comes to underwater classified (or not) submarine operations. However, we are now in a position to confirm beyond reasonable doubt that the German Submarine Operations Authority, abbreviated “SubOpAuth”, played a leading role in the deployment of submarines in the Danish, Swedish and Polish EEZs, during BALTOPS 22.

SubOpAuth are typically NATO/Allied organisations established through discrete national bilateral agreements that are often not constrained by the Law of the Sea Convention. They are responsible for Joint submarine operations in the areas covering coastal state(s) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as well as possible large swathes of ocean or waters.

On June 14, 2022, Danish  TV2 a Danish broadcaster based in Bornholm, Denmark was invited on board the Flyvefisken-class diving ship (Y311) Søløven (“Sea Lion”) to report on the activities of the Danish Navy’s Diving Service (Søværnets Dykkertjeneste) in the Baltic Sea during BALTOPS 22 (5-17 June 2022).

During the filming inside the Danish diving platform, Søløven (Y311), a Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) chart was inadvertently revealed, providing us with a unique look into the BALTOPS 22 construct.

Click here to read the full article.